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Abstract
We propose new specifications that explicitly account for information noise in
the input data of bankruptcy hazard models. The specifications are motivated
by a theory of modeling credit risk with incomplete information (Duffie and
Lando [2001]). Based on over 2 million firm-months of data during 1979-2012,
we demonstrate that our proposed specifications significantly improve both in-
sample model fit and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. The improvements
in forecasting accuracy are persistent throughout the 10-year holdout peri-
ods. The improvements are also robust to empirical setup, and are more
substantial in cases where information quality is a more serious problem. Our
findings provide strong empirical support for using our proposed hazard spec-
ifications in credit risk research and industry applications. They also reconcile
conflicting empirical results in the literature.
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1 Introduction
We propose new specifications within bankruptcy hazard functions that explicitly
account for information noise in the input data. The issues on input data have been of
long-standing interest in credit risk modeling, including information transparency, data
integrity, data quality, and their impact on models’ empirical performance. These issues
have recently become increasingly more important topics, during and post the global
financial crisis, in the academic literature and financial press.1 It is thus highly desirable
to develop statistical models that explicitly take into account of noise in the input data.
However, to the best of our knowledge, such models are virtually non-existent in the
empirical credit risk literature.
Motivated by the seminal work of Duffie and Lando [2001] on modeling credit risk
with incomplete information, we propose new hazard specifications that explicitly handle
noisy information, and demonstrate their empirical efficacy. Compared to the previous
literature on bankruptcy hazard models, our specifications have new variables in the
hazard function, which are the interaction effects between proxies for the degree of noise
and time-varying covariates. Based on over two million firm-months of panel data on
North American public firms during 1979–2012, within which there are more than 2,100
bankruptcies filed under Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, we show that our interaction effects
significantly improve both in-sample model fit and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy.
The improvements in forecasting accuracy are persistent over time, and are robust to
various empirical setup. We are also able to predict the signs of the coefficients on the
proposed interaction effects, which are strongly supported by the data.
When accounting information is noisy and the degree of noise is heterogeneous,2 the
theoretical results of Duffie and Lando [2001] imply that any monotonic transforma-
tion of the hazard rate is a nonlinear function of both the degree of noise and relevant
time-varying covariates. However, such non-linearity in the hazard function is typically
not modeled in the current practice of credit risk modeling.3 By further exploring this
implication, we find that one way to approximate the non-linearity is to use interaction
1The related news article, industry publications and academic papers include Morgenson, G., “Was
There A Loan It Didn’t Like?” New York Times, November 1, 2008; Bitner, R., Confessions of a Subprime
Lender, Wiley, 2008; Schoolman, P., 2008, “Credit Crisis Lessons for Modelers,” in Risk Management:
The Current Financial Crisis, Lessons Learned and Future Implications; Ng and Rusticus [2013]; to cite
a few.
2The heterogeneity in the degree of noise might be both cross-sectional and in time series.
3Typically, the current practice models monotonic transformations of the hazard rate as a linear
function of time-varying covariates. Well-known examples include studies using proportional hazard
models (for example, Bharath and Shumway [2008], Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007]), and those using
dynamic logistic regressions (for example, Shumway [2001], Chava and Jarrow [2004], Campbell, Hilscher
and Szilagyi [2008, 2011]). In particular, Cox [1972] Proportional Hazard models treat log(hazard) as
a linear function of covariates (and log[baseline hazard function]). Dynamic logistic regressions treat
logit(hazard) as a linear function.
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effects between proxies for the degree of noise and covariates.4 Accordingly, we develop an
approach to create hazard specifications that explicitly handle information noise, which
amounts to three simple steps. One, identify time-varying covariates. Two, identify a
proxy for the degree of noise. Three, construct interaction effects between the identi-
fied proxy and covariates. All these variables are candidates to be selected within the
bankruptcy hazard function. In particular, this paper chooses covariates from four well-
known hazard models in the literature, namely, the best-performing models in Shumway
[2001], Chava and Jarrow [2004], Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007], Bharath and Shumway
[2008], respectively. We also choose numerous candidates as proxies for the degree of noise
that are widely accepted in the finance literature, including firm size, analyst coverage
and analysts’ forecast variation.5
Our approach allows us to develop three empirically testable hypotheses, regarding
our proposed interaction effects. First, we test if the signs of the coefficients on the
interaction effects are consistent with theoretical predictions. Second, we test whether
our interaction effects as a whole improve in-sample Goodness-of-Fit. Finally, we test if
these effects improve out-of-sample forecasting accuracy.
We find strong empirical evidence consistent with the three hypotheses. First, the co-
efficients on our proposed interaction effects have the same signs as predicted by the
first hypothesis. Second, altogether these effects significantly improve the in-sample
model fit based on full-sample tests. Third, the models with our proposed effects persis-
tently outperform those without, in out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, according to two
well-accepted predictability measures, (1) Area Under ROC Curve (AUC), and (2) the
captured fractions of the total number of bankruptcies within deciles ranked by model
forecasts. For the first measure, the models with our effects have significantly higher year-
by-year AUC in typically 6 out of the 10 holdout years, and are no worse in any other
year.6 For the second measure, the models with our effects capture more bankruptcies in
top deciles and less in low-risk deciles, than the models without our effects. This implies
that models achieve more accurate classification and less mis-classification by using our
proposed interaction effects. The models with our effects also have predominantly higher
cumulative captured bankruptcies in all deciles, implying an unambiguous improvements
on forecasting accuracy. Finally, we conduct a variety of robustness checks. We show that
our results are robust to different empirical setup, and are substantially stronger when our
interaction effects are used in private firm models, where information quality is a more
serious problem. Therefore, our findings provide strong empirical support for using our
4We note that models in Chava and Jarrow [2004] also used interaction effects, between industry
groups and covariates. Nonetheless, they are not related to imperfect information.
5See, for example, Thomas [2002], Zhang [2006], Lin, Ma and Xuan [2011], Guo and Masulis [2012].
In particular, we use log(total assets) as a proxy for firm size in our main results, Sections 5.1 and 5.2,
and adopt other proxies in robustness checks, Section 5.3.
6The average of the year-by-year AUC improvements are also highly significant.
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proposed hazard specifications in real-world bankruptcy forecasting, where firm-specific
information is likely to be noisy.
We advance the empirical literature on corporate bankruptcy prediction, or more gen-
erally corporate default prediction, which dates back at least to Altman [1968], Beaver
[1966]. The state of the art in default/bankruptcy forecasting is probably represented
by hazard models (also known as intensity-based models, reduced-form models, survival
analysis or duration analysis). The best-known default/bankruptcy hazard models in-
clude those in, for example, Shumway [2001], Chava and Jarrow [2004], Duffie, Saita and
Wang [2007], Bharath and Shumway [2008], Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi [2008, 2011],
Chava, Stefanescu and Turnbull [2011], Duan, Sun and Wang [2012]. For comprehensive
reviews on this literature, see Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007] or Giesecke, Longstaff, Schae-
fer and Strebulaev [2011], and references therein. In addition to introducing new hazard
specifications that improve model performance, our paper also reconciles some conflicting
empirical findings in the previous literature. Particularly, there have been disagreements
on the statistical significance of covariates such as firm size and asset profitability in the
hazard function.7 Our paper provides plausible explanations on the discrepancies in the
empirical results, thus reconciles the literature.8
Our approach also has a broad range of industry applications on credit risk model-
ing.9 For instance, they are directly applicable to Probability of Default (PD) models
that are widely used by credit rating agents, or by virtually all banking institutions (as
internal rating tools), where concerns on data quality and verification quality of obligors’
information are prevalent.10
Apart from Duffie and Lando [2001], our paper is closely related to the theoretical
literature studying credit risk models with incomplete information, see, for example,
Giesecke [2004, 2006], Guo, Jarrow and Zeng [2009] and the sequel. Our paper provides
an empirical implementation of the theory, in justified and practical manners.11
Furthermore, our paper contributes to empirical studies investigating the impact of
financial reporting quality on bankruptcy forecasting accuracy,12 or the factors affecting
predictability and likelihood of corporate defaults.13 Within these types of empirical
7For example, Shumway [2001], Chava and Jarrow [2004] found that (relative) firm size is significant
with negative signs, while Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007], Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi [2011] found it
insignificant, or sometimes significant with positive signs. Similarly, Chava and Jarrow [2004], Bharath
and Shumway [2008] found that asset profitability measures, like net income divided by assets, are
significant with negative signs, but Chava, Stefanescu and Turnbull [2011] found it insignificant.
8See Section 3 and Section 5.3 for the explanations.
9This paper only investigates bankruptcy events, because bankruptcy data is publicly available and
is the only data available to us.
10PD models are widely used in the financial industry, in areas of Basel-compliant regulatory capital
measurement, economic capital management, risk management, portfolio management and pricing.
11Note that this paper does not consider other forms of imperfect information, for example, delayed
information. They might be considered in future empirical work.
12See, for example, Beaver, McNichols and Rhie [2005], Beaver, Correia and McNichols [2012].
13See, for example, Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi [2011], Tang, Subrahmanyam and Wang [2012],
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studies, our hazard specifications provide a potentially useful tool to account for noise in
econometricians’ information set. For example, our proposed interaction effects naturally
serve as control variables in credit risk-related empirical tests.
Our paper also has a technical contribution. As will be demonstrated in Section 5.3,
our proposed hazard specifications have a built-in mechanism to elegantly handle outliers,
by automatically adjusting the responsiveness of covariates based on the outliers’ degree
of noise. This mechanism requires minimum (or no) distortion of the input data, and is
shown to be effective in our empirical study.14
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores implications of
the theoretical results of Duffie and Lando [2001], and develops hypotheses accordingly.
Section 3 outlines the design of our empirical study. Section 4 describes the bankruptcy
dataset that we construct to test hypotheses. Section 5 presents the empirical results,
including evidence from full-sample tests, out-of-sample tests and robustness checks. Sec-
tion 6 concludes.
2 Hazard Specifications with Imperfect Information
In this section, we propose hazard specifications that account for information noise,
motivated by the theoretical results of Duffie and Lando [2001](henceforth DL). We then
develop three hypotheses related to the specifications.
2.1 Theory
We explore the results of DL, who considered a filtering problem when there is noise
in the observed assets of a debt issuer (henceforth “firm”). Using the notation of DL, the
stock of assets of the firm, Vt, is modeled as a geometric Brownian Motion (BM)15 with
initial value of V0. Although all parameters associated with the stochastic process of Vt
are known, Vt itself is not observable to the creditors of the firm. Instead, a noisy value of
assets is observed, denoted as Vˆt. It is assumed that log Vˆt = log Vt+Ut, where Ut denotes
random noise that is independent of log Vt, and is normally distributed with mean u and
standard deviation a. Note that the standard deviation a of Ut can be interpreted as
“a measure of the degree of noise” (Duffie and Lando [2001, p. 642]). We adopt this
interpretation throughout this paper.
The firm will file bankruptcy when log Vt first falls to some low boundary v.16 We
Cai, Saunders and Steffen [2012], Maffett, Owens and Srinivasan [2013] as more recent studies.
14The capability to handle outliers is a side benefit of our approach. While Section 5.3 gives an
example, we defer to future work for dedicated, full-blown empirical studies on this topic.
15All random variables are defined on a fixed probability space (Ω,F , P ).
16In the model of DL, v is determined by the firm owners within an optimal bankruptcy framework of
Leland [1994], Leland and Toft [1996]. Note that the firm owners (or managers) have perfect information
on the “true” value of assets, log Vt, to decide when to file bankruptcy. Thus, only creditors’ information
is noisy. Problems with asymmetric information was explicitly ruled out by DL, and is not considered
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denote the bankruptcy time as τ . Within this setup, Duffie and Lando [2001, Equation
26] showed that the conditional probability of bankruptcy at time t, during the period of
(s− t), s > t, is
P (t, s) = Pr(τ ≤ s|Vˆt, V0, τ > t) = 1−
∫ +∞
v
[1− pi(s− t, x− v)]g(x|Vˆt, V0, t)dx, (1)
where we refer to DL for the detailed expressions of pi(·) and g(·).
Under the assumption that accounting report is unbiased,17 the conditional probability
of bankruptcy (henceforth, PB), P (t, s), is a function of the standard deviation of noise
(a), the time-t observed assets (Vˆt), initial assets (V0), mean and volatility of the asset
growth rates, debt face value, among other parameters. See Appendix A for more detailed
descriptions on these parameters.
We are interested in the joint impact on PB of a and observed (noisy) asset returns,
denoted as rN , ( Vˆ1V0 − 1) at time t = 1, assuming V0 = 1 is observed with perfect
information and s = 2. Thus, we fix all other parameters at some values (see Appendix
A for values of these parameters), and vary levels of a and Vˆ1. We then numerically
evaluate P (1, 2) for various levels of a and rN , and graphically illustrate how PB changes
accordingly. This results a surface of PB as shown in Figure 1a.
There are two salient features about the shape of the PB surface in Figure 1a. First,
while in general, rN is decreasing in PB, the slope of PB with respect to rN varies with
a. With a higher level of a, the slope along the direction of rN becomes less steep. This
can be seen more clearly if we project the surface of PB onto the PB–rN plane, resulting
a contour plot in Figure 1b, i.e., PB curves with the same value of a (or “iso-a” curves).
Clearly, the slope of a PB curve given a lower a is steeper than that given a higher a.
This feature implies that, when asset information becomes noisier, the observed asset
returns, as a predictor, become less responsive to bankruptcy risk.18 This feature is
highly intuitive and are supported by numerous empirical studies, for example, Beaver,
McNichols and Rhie [2005], Beaver, Correia and McNichols [2012].
The second feature is that PB is increasing in a when rN is above around -4%, but
decreasing in a when rN is below around -8%.19 This feature is also intuitive, because with
here either.
17Unbiased accounting report means that u = −a22 so that E(Ut) = 1. We make this assumption
throughout this paper. It can be shown that the bias of accounting report does not materially impact
the interaction effects between the degree of noise and covariates. Thus this assumption is not central
to this paper, and will be topics of future research.
18In extreme cases, when the degree of noise is extremely high, the slope along the direction of rN
becomes almost flat, implying that coefficient on rN is close to zero. In these cases, observed asset
returns as a predictor will not accurately rank firms in terms of bankruptcy risk.
19Note that Figure 1a generalizes Duffie and Lando [2001, Figure 4], in a two-dimensional sense. Their
graph corresponds to the case where rN is zero in Figure 1a. Figure 1b is also similar to Duffie and
Lando [2001, Figure 6]. We note that Figure 1 implies when rN is near -6%, the monotonicity of PB in a
is indeterminate. The threshold of (around) -6% is due to the assumptions on specific parameter values
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(a) Probability of bankruptcy (PB) for various levels of standard deviation of noise, a, and observed
(noisy) asset returns, rN , ( Vˆ1V0 − 1)
(b) The projection of the surface of PB, in Figure 1a above, onto the PB–rN plane
Figure 1: Theoretical probability of bankruptcy, varying the degree of noise and observed
(noisy) asset returns
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noisier information, one should attribute the observed high (low) asset returns more to
noise rather than the true value of assets, which entails higher (lower) PB than noise-free
PB. Therefore, to assess the impact of information noisiness on PB, we should consider
it in context of other parameters (like rN) as demonstrated in Figure 1.
These two features persist even if we perform any monotonic transformation of PB,
such as logarithmic or logit transformations. This is because monotonic transformations
do not change relative magnitude and the sign of the slope. Therefore, any monotonically
transformed PB still has steeper (less steep) slope along the direction of rN for lower
(higher) a, and is increasing (decreasing) in a for higher (lower) rN . We graphically
illustrate the surface of logarithmic transformation of PB in Figure 2a. Figure 2a is
identical to Figure 1a, except that the vertical axis is now log(PB). Again, we plot the
projection of the surface of log(PB) onto the log(PB)–rN plane, in Figure 2b.
The above analysis shows that any monotonic transformation of PB is a non-linear
function of both a and rN when there exists heterogeneity in the degree of noise, either
across firms or over time.20 One obvious way to approximate such non-linearity within
models of PB is to use an interaction effect between a and rN , i.e. (a∗rN). This is directly
implied by Figure 2b. To provide more insights into this approximation, note that, when
(a ∗ rN) is added, the coefficient on rN can now be viewed as a linear function of a, and
thus varies depending on levels of a. This mechanism precisely models the variation of
log(PB)’s slope with respect to rN , conditional on a. The use of interaction effects, of
course, also has mathematical convenience to keep (any monotonic transformation of)
PB within the linear family.
Although noise is associated with firm’s assets and all other parameters are assumed
to be known without noise, the slope of PB with respect to other parameters might also
vary with a, a feature similar to that shown in Figure 2. Such parameters include the
mean and volatility of the asset growth rates, denoted as µ and σ respectively. The
theoretical relationship between log(PB) and µ or σ, for various levels of a, is depicted
in Figures 4 and 5, respectively, in Appendix A. Likewise, for various levels of a, we
also plot the relationship between log(PB) and normalized debt face value,21 D
Vˆ1
, where
D denotes the debt face value, in Figure 6 of Appendix A. In all graphs, log(PB) has a
steeper slope (with respect to the corresponding covariate) when a is lower, and a flatter
slope when a is higher. Thus, we might also incorporate interaction effects between a
and unbiased accounting report. When we change these assumptions, the PB surface might shift along
any axis (implying changes of the signs on main effects of a), but the shape of this surface, and thus the
two features, remains the same.
20As can be seen in Figure 2b, the current practice of modeling a linear relationship, between covariates
and monotonic transformation of PB, implicitly assumes that the degree of noise is the same across firms
and over time, which is unlikely in reality.
21We consider normalized debt face value because it is popular in the empirical credit risk literature,
typically as a proxy for leverage.
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(a) log(probability of bankruptcy) (log(PB)) for various levels of standard deviation of noise, a, and
observed (noisy) asset returns, rN , ( Vˆ1V0 − 1)
(b) The projection of the surface of log(PB), in Figure 2a above, onto the log(PB)–rN plane
Figure 2: Theoretical log(probability of bankruptcy), varying the degree of noise and
observed (noisy) asset returns
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and these parameters, i.e., (a ∗ µ), (a ∗ σ) or (a ∗ D
Vˆ1
), when modeling log(PB).22
We note that the empirical success of our interaction effects depends on the hetero-
geneity in the variables a, rN , µ, σ and DVˆ1 . As is evident in Figures 2, 4, 5 and 6, if
either of these variables lacks variation, the corresponding interaction effect may fail to
be detected as significant in empirical estimation. Therefore, in empirical study, we try
to avoid data exclusions as much as possible, in order to better exploit variation in these
variables. Interestingly, this differs from the common practice of forecasting bankruptcy
or default, which manipulates data to avoid extreme values (i.e., outliers) in independent
variables.
2.2 Hypotheses on Proposed Hazard Specifications
It is natural to approximate PB, i.e., P (t, s) in Equation (1), using hazard rate,
denoted as λt, because λt is the continuous-time limit of P (t, t+∆t), and it can be shown
that this limit exists in the case of incomplete information,23
λt , lim
∆t→0
P (t, t+ ∆t)
∆t
. (2)
Consequently, in light of our analysis in Section 2.1, within the hazard function we can
also use the interaction effects between proxies for a and time-varying covariates.
We develop three empirically testable hypotheses related to our proposed interaction
effects. First, the features of PB surfaces in Figures 2, 4, 5 and 6 allow us to predict the
signs of the coefficients on our proposed interaction effects.
Hypothesis 1 (Signs of the Coefficients). Supposing there is one proxy for the degree of
noise, a, that is decreasing in a, then the interaction effect, between this proxy and any
covariate that is decreasing (increasing) in hazard rate, will have a negative (positive)
coefficient.
For example, without any interaction effect, the observed (noisy) asset return, rN , is
decreasing in the hazard rate (as shown in Figures 2). Hypothesis 1 thus predicts any
interaction effect between rN and a proxy for a (decreasing in a) has a negative sign. It is
straightforward to verify that this prediction is in accordance with the analysis in Section
2.1. We provide further intuition on Hypothesis 1 in Section 3 later (as explanations on
Equation (4)).
Second, if Equation (1) indeed represents the real-world data-generating process
(DGP) of bankruptcy, then we expect that our proposed hazard specifications should
improve empirical performance of hazard models, including both in-sample model fit and
22We also find there might exist higher-order interaction effects between a, rN and other parameters.
For simplicity, we only consider first-order interaction effects in this study.
23This result is also due to DL, which showed that λt exists when there is incomplete information,
and thus justified the use of hazard models, or similar statistical models, in practice.
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out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. This is because, while hazard models without our
proposed interaction effects try to model the relationship between monotonic transfor-
mations of PB and covariates as a hyperplane, our specifications effectively model the
relationship as a surface similar to that implied by the DGP (shown in Figures 2). Better
approximations of the DGP should be reflected in empirical model performance. There-
fore, we develop the following two hypotheses.
Hypothesis 2 (In-Sample Goodness-of-Fit). Hazard models with the proposed interaction
effects, between proxies for a and time-varying covariates, have significantly better in-
sample Goodness-of-Fit than those without.
Hypothesis 3 (Out-of-Sample Forecasting Accuracy). Hazard models with the proposed
interaction effects, between proxies for a and time-varying covariates, have significantly
better out-of-sample forecasting accuracy than those without.
3 Empirical Design
We conduct empirical study in three steps. First, similar to Duffie, Saita and Wang
[2007], Bharath and Shumway [2008], we specify the hazard rate as a Cox [1972] propor-
tional hazard model (henceforth, Cox model),
λt = ht exp(β
′Xt), (3)
where ht is an arbitrary and unspecified baseline hazard function common to all firms, Xt
is a vector of time-varying covariates, β is a vector of coefficients.24 β can be estimated
using the partial likelihood function of Cox [1972] without requiring estimation of ht.25
Next, we choose the covariates, Xt, from four well-known bankruptcy hazard models
in the literature (henceforth, “reference models”), instead of identifying them by ourselves.
The reasons for this design are threefold. First, the reference models are widely accepted
as the state of the art in credit risk prediction, and are frequently cited.26 Their choices
of Xt also have economic interpretations that are aligned with our analysis in Section
2.1. See below the detailed descriptions of Xt within these models. Second, we use the
reference models as benchmarks for model comparison purposes. Hence, their choices of
Xt serve as control variables when testing the impact of our proposed interaction effects.27
24“ ′ ” is the transpose operator. Cox model implies that log λt = log ht + β′Xt, which fits into our
analysis in Section 2.1.
25Because this paper only studies ranking power of models, the estimate of ht is not required.
26For more recent citations of these models, see, for example, Tang, Subrahmanyam and Wang [2012],
Maffett, Owens and Srinivasan [2013].
27We note that the reference models might not include covariates like firm liquidity (see, for example,
Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi [2011]). We defer empirical tests on our proposed specifications using a
more comprehensive set of covariates (potentially beyond those used in the extant literature) to future
research.
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Third, this design allows us to demonstrate the generality of our approach. Our hazard
specifications impose no restriction on Xt, and thus can be used in combination with any
existing choice of Xt, as long as they are properly analyzed as we demonstrate here.
Finally, we create four new models (henceforth, “augmented models”) by creating
interaction effects between proxies for a and covariates, and adding them into the reference
models’ hazard functions. Each augmented model corresponds to one reference model.
Now the hazard rate of an augmented model becomes
λt = ht exp
[
β¯′Xt + γ¯0a˜+
I∑
i=1
γ¯i(a˜ ∗X it)
]
, (4)
where β¯ denotes a vector of coefficients on the main effects of Xt, I is the number of
additional interaction effects, a˜ denotes a proxy for a such that higher a˜ represents lower
a, X it denotes the ith covariate with which a˜ interacts, and γ¯0, . . . , γ¯I are coefficients on
a˜ and interaction effects respectively.
We provide more intuition, using Equation (4), why Hypothesis 1 is in accordance
with our analysis in Section 2.1. First, we note that the coefficients on X it are different
in Equations (3) and (4). In Equation (3) where there is no interaction effect, the coef-
ficient on X it is the corresponding element within β, denoted as βi. In Equation (4), the
coefficient can be viewed as (β¯i + γ¯ia˜) where β¯i is the coefficient on the main effect of X it .
Hypothesis 1 predicts that βi and γ¯i have the same sign. If this is true, then lower degree
of noise (i.e., higher a˜) entails that (β¯i + γ¯ia˜) is more consistent with βi. For example,
when βi and γ¯i have the (same) positive sign, lower degree of noise entails that (β¯i + γ¯ia˜)
is more positive, or less negative.28 In other words, Hypothesis 1 implies that when the
degree of noise is lower, X it is more responsive to log λt, which is precisely the intuition
behind the analysis in Section 2.1.
The four reference models used in our study are “Model with accounting and market
variables” in Shumway [2001], “Public firm model with industry effects” in Chava and
Jarrow [2004], the intensity model in Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007] and “Model 7” in
Bharath and Shumway [2008], respectively. These models are the best-performing one in
the corresponding articles. Henceforth, we call the reference models “S01 Model”, “CJ04
Model”, “DSW07-S Model” and “BS08 Model”, respectively. Note that “DSW07-S Model”
is a simplified version of the intensity model of Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007].29
We recognize that some covariates chosen by the reference models can be loosely
28Likewise, if both βi and γ¯i have the negative sign, then lower degree of noise (i.e., higher a˜) entails
that (β¯i + γ¯ia˜) is more negative, or less positive.
29We use “-S” to highlight that our implementation is a “simplified” version. There are two simplifica-
tions within our implementation. First, we use a “naïve” version of Distance-to-Default (DD) measure,
developed by Bharath and Shumway [2008]. Bharath and Shumway [2008] showed that the default pre-
diction performance of DD is robust to how it is implemented. Second, for simplicity, we do not model
the time series dynamics of covariates.
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interpreted as proxies for parameters analyzed in Section 2.1, namely, observed (noisy)
asset return, the expected asset return, volatility of asset return and normalized debt
face value.30 Therefore, we use these covariates to construct potential interaction effects.
Note that whether or not a potential interaction effect is included in our augmented
models is determined by the statistical significance of its coefficient, an empirical decision
that is data dependent. The covariates used in each reference model and the potential
interaction effects are described as follows.31
S01 Model has five covariates: (1) Net Income/Total Asset (NI/TA); (2) Total Li-
ability/Total Asset (TL/TA); (3) firm’s relative size (RSIZE) defined as the difference
between the logarithm of firm’s equity value and the logarithm of the total NYSE &
AMEX market capitalization; (4) firm’s stock excess return (EXRET) defined as differ-
ence between firm’s trailing one-year stock return and the value-weighted CRSP NYSE
& AMEX index return; and (5) firm’s stock volatility (σE). We use four of them to
construct potential interaction effects, based on their economic interpretations. First, it
is natural to (loosely) interpret NI/TA and TL/TA as proxies of observed (noisy) asset
return and normalized debt face value, respectively. Second, we view σE as a rough proxy
for volatility of asset return. Finally, although EXRET is excess return, not firm’s stock
return, it can be viewed as a crude approximation of the trailing one-year stock return.
The trailing one-year stock return is commonly used as a “naïve” proxy for the expected
asset return (see, for example, Bharath and Shumway [2008]).32 As a result, we obtain
four potential interaction effects within S01 Model.
CJ04 Model includes all the covariates used in S01 Model, with additional industry
effects. Hence, the potential interaction effects in CJ04 Model are the same as in S01
Model.
In DSW07-S Model, there are four covariates: (1) a “naïve” version of Distance-
to-Default measure (Naïve DD) defined as, roughly speaking, the number of standard
deviations of asset growth rate by which the expected log assets exceed log debts;33 (2)
firm’s trailing one-year stock return (RETURN); (3) three-month Treasury bill rate (3m
T-rate); and (4) trailing one year return on the S&P500 index (SPX). We construct two
potential interaction effects, with Naïve DD and RETURN respectively. This is because
Naïve DD is effectively a synthesis of the expected asset return, volatility of asset return
and normalized debt face value, and RETURN is commonly used as a proxy for the
30We also recognize that it is impossible to precisely map parameters in Section 2.1 to the covariates
used in the reference models. This is because these covariates are identified based on empirical perfor-
mance rather than theoretical considerations. However, we do find similarity between their economic
interpretations, and thus can roughly approximate the parameters using these covariates.
31Also see Table 1 for a summary of covariates used in the reference models.
32This approximation is plausible, because, like the expected asset return, EXRET is also decreasing
in PB.
33It is called a “naïve” version because the implementation uses naïve proxies for parameters, see
Bharath and Shumway [2008] for details.
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expected asset return (see, for example, Bharath and Shumway [2008]). Consequently,
we have two potential interaction effects within DSW07-S Model.
There are six covariates in BS08 Model: (1) probability of bankruptcy measured using
Naïve DD (piNaïve), defined as N(−Naïve DD), where N(·) is the Gaussian cumulative
distribution function; (2) logarithm of firm’s market capitalization of equity (logE), where
E is defined as the product of month-end stock price and number of shares outstanding;
(3) logarithm of firm’s debt face value (logF ), where F is defined as (Compustat item
“Debt in Current Liabilities”)+1
2
(Compustat item “Total Long-Term Debt”); and three
covariates used in S01 Model, namely, (4) σE, (5) EXRET and (6) NI/TA. We use all of
them to construct potential interaction effects. The justifications of choosing piNaïve, σE,
EXRET and NI/TA are the same as those in DSW07-S Model and S01 Model. The use
of logE and logF is justified by interpreting them altogether as a proxy for normalized
debt face value. As such we get six potential interaction effects within BS08 Model.
To select a˜ in Equation (4), i.e. proxies for the degree of noise a, there is a wide range
of choices in the finance literature. In our study, we try a number of popular candidates
described as follows.34
One natural choice of a˜ is firm size. Greater firm size implies less degree of noise (see,
for example, Zhang [2006], Lin, Ma and Xuan [2011]). To construct interaction effects
within S01 Model, CJ04 Model and DSW07-S Model, we use log(Total Asset) (log(TA))
as the proxy for firm size when reporting our main results. As a robustness check, we
also try another two proxies for firm size: log(equity market value) (logE), and log(Asset
Rank) (log(AR)) where Asset Rank is obtained by ranking all surviving firms every month
according to their total assets.35 Note that, unlike log(TA) or logE that captures firms’
absolute size effect, log(AR) measures firms’ relative size cross-sectionally.36 In BS08
Model, logE is already used as a covariate and is strongly correlated with log(TA).37
Hence, to avoid potential multi-collinearity problems, within BS08 Model we only use
34We stress that we do not intend to search for the “best” proxies for the degree of noise. Our focus
is to study the real-world benefits of using our proposed interaction effects, together with popular (and
reasonable) candidates of a˜.
35In this study, we rank firms into 1,000 groups.
36We note that S01 and CJ04 models have a covariate, RSIZE, which might also be viewed as a proxy
for (relative) firm size. We address potential concerns on multi-collinearity, when using RSIZE together
with proxies for firm size, in several ways. First, we compute the contemporaneous correlation between
RSIZE and log(TA) or log(AR), and find it is moderate within our dataset, at around 0.6–0.7. Second,
we find the variance inflation factors (VIF) of RSIZE, log(TA) and log(AR) are typically around 2–5,
below the standard threshold of 10. These diagnostics indicate that multi-collinearity is mild. Moreover,
the out-of-sample results in Section 5.2 confirm that multi-collinearity might be less a problem when
using RSIZE and log(TA) or log(AR) together. Therefore, we include RSIZE as a covariate when using
log(TA) or log(AR) as proxies for firm size. Nevertheless, multi-collinearity does become a problem
when we use logE as a proxy, because the contemporaneous correlation between logE and RSIZE is
0.92. Hence, we exclude RSIZE from S01 and CJ04 models when using logE as the proxy for firm
size. As a robustness check (not shown here), we also take RSIZE as a proxy for firm size within the
augmented S01 and CJ04 models, and obtain similarly strong results supporting our hypotheses.
37The contemporaneous correlation between logE and log(TA) is 0.82 within our dataset.
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logE as a proxy for firm size when constructing interaction effects.
We note that interpreting firm size as a proxy for the degree of noise might reconcile
the conflicting empirical findings on firm size in the extant literature. As can be shown in
Figure 2, log(PB) might be increasing, decreasing, or non-monotonic, with the degree of
noise, depending on the values of other covariates like observed asset returns. Therefore,
in models without our proposed interaction effects, the coefficient on firm size depends
on the slope of log(PB) along firm size at the average levels of other covariates,38 and
thus is data-dependent within our framework. This provides a plausible explanation why
empirical studies can have different findings on statistical significance, or sometimes the
sign, of the coefficient on firm size.
Apart from firm size, analyst coverage and analysts’ forecast variation are also popular
proxies for the degree of noise. Higher coverage and lower variation implies less degree of
noise (see, for example, Thomas [2002], Guo and Masulis [2012]). Therefore, in robustness
checks (Section 5.3), we also use these two proxies, namely, Analyst Coverage (AC),
defined as the number of monthly analyst forecasts on EPS or NAV, and normalized
variation of analysts’ forecasts (− log(CV)), defined as − log(Coefficient of Variation)
where
Coefficient of Variation , Standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts
Absolute value of mean analysts’ forecasts
. (5)
Note that − log(CV) is constructed such that it is decreasing in the degree of noise, in
order to be aligned with Hypothesis 1.
4 Data
We construct a comprehensive bankruptcy dataset for North American public firms
during 1979-2012,39 including both Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 filings. We identify
bankruptcies from a variety of sources, namely, New Generation Bankruptcy Database,40
UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Database, and the Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD).
Following Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007], we also identify additional bankruptcies from
firms with Compustat deletion reasons as “02-Bankruptcy” (Compustat items DLRSN,
DLRSNI).41 These data sources are standard in bankruptcy studies.42 Moreover, to en-
38For models with our interaction effects, the coefficient on the main effect of firm size represents the
slope of log(PB) along firm size when other covariates are zero.
39There are few bankruptcies filed in early 2013. We treat them as if they were filed in December 31,
2012.
40The data is publicly available at www.BankruptcyData.com.
41We manually verify bankruptcy date and status using a random sample of the firms with
DLRSN/DLRSNI as “02”, and find this indicator is highly accurate. However, we do not use
DLRSN/DLRSNI value of “03-Liquidation”, as we find it might be unrelated to bankruptcy.
42See, for example, Tang, Subrahmanyam and Wang [2012], Cai, Saunders and Steffen [2012] as more
recent studies.
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sure accuracy of bankruptcy dates and status, which are the response variables in our em-
pirical study, we manually verify more than 1,000 firms that have ambiguous bankruptcy
information, using SEC filings and other public information sources.43 Finally, we link
these bankruptcy events, using CIK and CUSIP, to Compustat North America Quarterly
accounting data (henceforth, Compustat),44 which is further merged with CRSP monthly
stock market data (henceforth, CRSP), resulting a firm-month panel dataset.45
In order to properly develop independent variables, i.e., time-varying covariates and
proxies for the degree of noise, within our dataset, we further require that (i) any bankrupt
firm appear in both Compustat and CRSP; (ii) any bankrupt firm have bankruptcy date
no later than 5 years after the last available observation in Compustat/CRSP;46 and (iii)
each firm-month observation have at least 6 months’ stock returns in the previous one
year, and have non-missing, nonzero equity market value in CRSP. Like Chava and Jarrow
[2004], when there are multiple bankruptcies associated with a firm, we only consider the
first one, and we assume uninformative left censoring.47 Note that we try to avoid data
exclusions due to data quality reasons. This is because we want to better exploit both
cross-sectional and time-series variation in firms’ accounting/market information, and
variation in the degree of noise.48
After applying the above rules, we are able to obtain 2,112 bankruptcies, and 2,152,203
firm-month observations, from a total of 20,180 firms, in our final panel dataset. The
total number of bankruptcies is similar to those observed in recent bankruptcy studies.49
We plot and tabulate the bankruptcy profile of our dataset, for each year during 1979-
2012, in Figure 3. Within Figure 3, Panel 3a depicts the number of bankruptcies and
the bankruptcy rate by year, as blue bars and red lines, with vertical axes labeling on
the left and right respectively. Panel 3b provides the detailed data used to plot Panel
3a. The general patterns, which show peaks of bankruptcies in early 1990s, early 2000s
and around 2009, are consistent with those demonstrated by the previous literature. See,
43We search firms using CIK within SEC Filings including 8-K, Administrative Proceeding, 10-K(or
10-KSB), and so on. We also search firms by combinations of firm name, Chair/CEO name, address,
phone number, IRS number, CUSIP, ticker, CIK and industry, from news, online market information,
online business/company information, court documents, credit reports, and so forth.
44For bankrupt firms identified by UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Database and Compustat
DLRSN/DLRSNI, they already have GVKEY to be merged with Compustat accounting data.
45We carry forward Compustat quarterly observations to make it a monthly dataset.
46If a bankrupt firm exits Compustat/CRSP databases 5 (or more) years earlier than it files
bankruptcy, we treat it as right censored at one month after the final Compustat/CRSP observation.
The choice of 5 years is arbitrary. In practice, it is unlikely that creditors use information older than 5
years to make one-year ahead bankruptcy predictions.
47Right censoring occurs at the following three types of dates: (i) the date that a firm is deleted
from Compustat (the earlier of Compustat items DLDTE and DLDTEI); (ii) if the Compustat delete
date is more than 5 years later than the last available observation in Compustat/CRSP, then the firm is
censored at one month after the final Compustat/CRSP observation; and (iii) otherwise, December 31,
2012.
48In robustness checks (Section 5.3), we follow convention in the previous literature to exclude financial
firms.
49See, for example, Tang, Subrahmanyam and Wang [2012], Cai, Saunders and Steffen [2012].
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for example, bankruptcy rate time-series in Chava and Jarrow [2004], or default rate
time-series in Giesecke, Longstaff, Schaefer and Strebulaev [2011].
While most of the independent variables are developed using Compustat and CRSP
data items, we construct the following variables from Datastream and IBES: three-month
Treasury bill rate is from Datastream, and the two proxies for the degree of noise, namely
Analyst Coverage (AC) and normalized variation of analysts’ forecasts(− log(CV)), are
derived from IBES. Furthermore, we perform a number of data transformations on inde-
pendent variables, as follows.
First, following Shumway [2001], Chava and Jarrow [2004], Bharath and Shumway
[2008], we winsorize all Compustat-related covariates at 1st and 99th percentiles,50 and
impute missing values of Compustat-related covariates for any firm-month observation by
carrying forward the most recent value of the relevant covariate available to that particular
firm. Second, we find that only about 53% of the observations within our dataset have
IBES information. For observations with no IBES information, we treat them as the
noisiest observations, i.e., we set their AC to be 0, and − log(CV) to be the lowest value
in the data.51 Third, where applicable, we translate all Compustat items into US Dollar
using Compustat item CURUSCNQ, before deriving any independent variable.52 Fourth,
if any firm-month observation has less than 12 months’ stock returns in the previous one
year, we calculate the annualized trailing one year return and volatility for that particular
observation.
Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the definitions and key descriptive statistics of the
covariates, and of the proxies for the degree of noise, respectively, after winzorization and
missing value imputation.53 The conceptual descriptions of the independent variables are
also explained in Section 3.
The summary statistics of the covariates in Table 1 are very similar to those in the
previous literature (see, for example, Shumway [2001], Chava and Jarrow [2004], Bharath
and Shumway [2008]), except that the standard deviations of most variables are higher.
Larger variation reflects greater heterogeneity within our sample, both in cross section
and in time series. This is in fact the case that we are particularly interested in.54
50The winsorization is intended to remove potential data errors within Compustat, see Shumway
[2001], Chava and Jarrow [2004].
51We also set − log(CV) to the lowest value in the sample if the standard deviation of analyst forecasts
is undefined when the number of forecasts is 1, and set − log(CV) to the highest value when the standard
deviation of analyst forecasts is zero (i.e., complete consensus among analysts).
52There are more than 10% firms in our dataset are Canadian firms, with native currency of CAD.
53In Table 1, we only report the mean values for the three industry dummy variables, IND2–IND4,
because the mean represents the proportion of observations that fall into an industry group. For example,
IND4 has a mean of 0.18, indicating that 18% of the observations are in the industry group 4.
54The variation is larger because, in contrast to the previous literature which typically focused a
subpopulation of firms (for example, industrial firms or firms listed in large stock exchanges), we try to
include as many firms into our sample as possible. In particular, we notice that the covariates related
to the trailing one year stock returns (e.g. RETURN, EXRET) have few extreme values. Some of the
extreme returns come from “penny stock” firms and some are due to annualization of less-than-12-months
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(a) The number of bankruptcies and bankruptcy rates by year, within our dataset, during 1979–2012.
The bankruptcy rates are calculated as percentages of the number of surviving firms each year. The
number of bankruptcies are plotted as (blue) bars with vertical axis labeling on the left, and bankruptcy
rates are plotted as (red) lines with vertical axis on the right.
(b) This table reports the year, the number of bankruptcies, the number of surviving firms and the
bankruptcy rate as % of the number of firms in the year, for each year within our dataset, during
1979–2012.
Figure 3: The bankruptcy profile of our dataset, for each year during 1979–2012.
Our dataset is constructed by assembling bankruptcy filings of North American public firms, within the
Compustat/CRSP universe, from New Generation Bankruptcy Database, UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy
Database, the Fixed Income Securities Database and firms with Compustat deletion reasons as “02-
Bankruptcy”. We also require that (i) any bankrupt firm appear in both Compustat and CRSP; (ii)
any bankrupt firm have bankruptcy date no later than 5 years after the last available observation from
Compustat/CRSP; and (iii) any firm-month observation have at least 6 months’ stock returns in the
previous one year, and have non-missing, nonzero equity market value in CRSP. Applying these rules,
and merging Compustat and CRSP databases, we obtain our final panel dataset that consists of 2,112
bankruptcies and 2,152,203 firm-month observations during 1979–2012.
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Table 2: Summary statistics of proxies for the degree of noise
1979–2012, 2,112 bankruptcies, 2,152,203 firm-months, 20,180 firms in total
Proxies for a Mean Median Min Max Std. Dev.
log(TA) 5.38 5.28 -6.91 15.17 2.38
log(AR) 5.91 6.22 0.00 6.91 0.99
AC 3.53 1.00 0.00 55.00 5.88
− log(CV) -2.75 -7.25 -7.25 12.08 5.47
This table reports the summary statistics of the proxies for a, the degree of noise, used in this study.
The sample period is 1979–2012. Our firm-month panel dataset has 2,112 bankruptcies, and 2,152,203
firm-month observations, from a total of 20,180 firms. log(TA), which is log(Total Asset), is defined
as log(Compustat item ATQ) where ATQ is in millions of USD. log(AR) is log(Asset Rank), where
Asset Rank is obtained by ranking all surviving firms every month into 1,000 groups based on their
ATQ. AC, i.e., Analyst Coverage, is defined as the number of monthly analyst forecasts on EPS or
NAV, obtained from IBES. − log(CV) is the normalized variation of analysts’ forecasts, and is defined
as − log(Coefficient of Variation) where Coefficient of Variation is defined as (Standard deviation of
monthly analyst forecasts)/(Absolute value of mean monthly analysts forecasts), with both numerator
and denominator obtained from IBES. AC is set to 0 when it has missing value. When − log(CV) has
missing value, we consider two cases. If it has missing value because the standard deviation of analyst
forecasts is zero, it is set to the highest value (12.08). Otherwise, it is set to the lowest value (-7.25).
Table 2 provides the summary statistics of the proxies for the degree of noise, a, used
in this study.55 All proxies are constructed so that they are decreasing in a. As shown
in Table 2, for AC and − log(CV), more than half of the observations in our dataset
have only one or two values (which are the lowest values), due to missing values. Thus,
variation in these two variables are much less than other variables’.
5 Empirical Results
In this section, we report the results of our empirical study. We conduct full-sample
tests to test Hypotheses 1 and 2, and conduct out-of-sample tests, on forecasting accuracy,
to test Hypothesis 3. Finally, we report results on a variety of robustness checks, using
both full-sample and out-of-sample tests.
5.1 Full Sample Tests
To test Hypothesis 1, we estimate four augmented models, by adding our proposed
interaction effects into the reference models, using the full sample during 1979-2012. The
(yet still very large) returns. In Table 1, we report the 99th percentile of these variables (in parentheses),
which are close to the maximum values of these variables reported in the previous literature. We do not
winsorize, however, these market-related variables in our empirical study, following convention in the
previous literature. This poses no problems on our approach, because one advantage of our approach is
in fact the built-in mechanism of handling such outliers. Moreover, we find that results from winsorizing
these variables (not shown in this paper), at 99th percentile, are almost identical to the reported results.
55One proxy, logE, is not summarized here, because it is also a covariate in BS08 Model, and is
summarized in Table 1.
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four reference models are also estimated. The full-sample estimates of all models are
reported in the columns labeled by the model names within Table 3.
As can be seen in Table 3, the signs and magnitudes of the coefficients within the
reference models are consistent with those in the previous literature.56 For augmented
models, we select interaction effects by initially including all the potential ones described
in Section 3 (i.e., four interaction effects in S01 Model, four effects in CJ04 Model, two
effects in DSW07-S Model, six effects in BS08 Model), and then eliminating any inter-
action effect whose coefficient is not significantly different from zero at 10% level.57 As
shown in Table 3, we select three, four, one and three interaction effects in the final
augmented S01, CJ04, DSW07-S and BS08 Model, respectively. We report, in paren-
theses, standard errors that robust to model mis-specification (see, for example, Lin and
Wei [1989], Allison [2010]),58 which are typically larger than conventional model-based
standard errors.59
In Table 3, the signs of the coefficients on the interaction effects, in the augmented
models, are consistent with the predictions of Hypothesis 1. For example, the coefficient
on NI/TA has a negative sign in CJ04 Model. In the augmented CJ04 Model, the
coefficient on interaction effect between NI/TA and log(TA) also has a negative sign,
as predicted by Hypothesis 1. Note that the coefficient on NI/TA is now [−1.57 −
0.26 log(TA)]. Hence, firms with higher total assets, i.e., with lower degree of noise, will
have greater coefficients on NI/TA in magnitude (with a negative sign). This implies that
the slope along the direction of NI/TA becomes steeper for lower degree of noise, which
is precisely what Figure 2b illustrates. Likewise, the coefficient on TL/TA is [2.09 +
0.15 log(TA)], and thus is greater in magnitude (with a positive sign) when the degree of
noise is lower. Again this is consistent with Hypothesis 1. As will be shown in robustness
checks (Section 5.3), this conclusion is robust to the choices of data constructions and
alternative proxies for the degree of noise.60
Therefore, we find strong empirical evidence consistent with Hypothesis 1. We are
56The only exception is the coefficient on “3m T-rate” in DSW07-S Model, which has a different sign
from that in Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007]. However, when we use a dynamic logistic regression (which
implies non-proportional hazard rates), we find that the sign is consistent with that in Duffie, Saita and
Wang [2007]. In spite of this sensitivity of “3m T-rate” to different hazard functional forms, we find
that DSW07-S Model used here has high out-of-sample predictive power, as shown in Section 5.2 below,
which shows its validity. Also note that the magnitude of the coefficient on “3m T-rate” is about 100
times of that in Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007] because they used values in percentage whereas we use
decimal values.
57This variable selection method is called “backward elimination”. The selection of interaction effects
is, of course, not unique. We also try other combinations of interaction effects within the augmented
models, and find similar improvements on model performance.
58Typical model mis-specification includes omission of other covariates or non-linear terms, which are
relevant to reduced-form models studied here.
59The robust standard errors are obtained from the “sandwich" variance estimator. It is unclear
whether the robust standard errors were used in the previous literature.
60We stress that Hypothesis 1 says nothing about the main effect of the proxy for the degree of noise.
We include the main effects in order to facilitate inclusion of interaction effects.
21
Table 3: Full-sample estimates of four bankruptcy hazard models, with and without our
proposed interaction effects
Dependent Variable: Time to Bankruptcy
1979–2012, 2,152,203 firm-months, 2,112 bankruptcies
(Robust standard errors in parentheses)
Variable S01 Model Augmented CJ04 Model AugmentedS01 Model CJ04 Model
NI/TA -0.40** ( 0.20 ) -0.45 ( 0.31 ) -0.38 ( 0.29 ) -1.57*** ( 0.38 )
TL/TA 2.98*** ( 0.09 ) 2.76*** ( 0.09 ) 2.85*** ( 0.13 ) 2.09*** ( 0.19 )
EXRET -1.77*** ( 0.13 ) -0.20** ( 0.10 ) -1.64*** ( 0.13 ) -0.14 ( 0.10 )
RSIZE -0.18*** ( 0.02 ) -0.31*** ( 0.02 ) -0.18*** ( 0.02 ) -0.35*** ( 0.02 )
σE 0.21*** ( 0.02 ) 0.14*** ( 0.04 ) 0.20*** ( 0.02 ) 0.12*** ( 0.04 )
IND2 -0.50*** ( 0.14 ) -0.53*** ( 0.15 )
IND3 -0.14 ( 0.26 ) 0.22 ( 0.26 )
IND4 -0.64 ( 0.49 ) -0.24 ( 0.47 )
NI/TA*IND2 0.89** ( 0.39 ) 0.77** ( 0.37 )
TL/TA*IND2 0.51*** ( 0.18 ) 0.56*** ( 0.18 )
NI/TA*IND3 0.13 ( 0.60 ) 0.69 ( 0.58 )
TL/TA*IND3 0.29 ( 0.30 ) -0.39 ( 0.30 )
NI/TA*IND4 -3.30*** ( 0.72 ) -2.40*** ( 0.78 )
TL/TA*IND4 -0.24 ( 0.56 ) -1.13** ( 0.54 )
log(TA) -0.02 ( 0.02 ) -0.04 ( 0.04 )
EXRET*log(TA) -0.32*** ( 0.02 ) -0.30*** ( 0.02 )
NI/TA*log(TA) -0.51*** ( 0.06 ) -0.26*** ( 0.08 )
σE*log(TA) 0.04** ( 0.02 ) 0.04** ( 0.02 )
TL/TA*log(TA) 0.15*** ( 0.04 )
DSW07-S Model Augmented BS08 Model AugmentedDSW07-S Model BS08 Model
Naïve DD -0.40*** ( 0.02 ) -0.32*** ( 0.03 )
RETURN -1.10*** ( 0.15 ) -0.92*** ( 0.15 )
3m T-rate 21.70*** ( 2.90 ) 20.45*** ( 2.87 )
SPX 1.62*** ( 0.29 ) 1.57*** ( 0.28 )
log(TA) -0.06*** ( 0.01 )
(Naïve DD)*log(TA) -0.02*** ( 0.00 )
piNaïve 1.47*** ( 0.14 ) 1.42*** ( 0.14 )
logE -0.24*** ( 0.02 ) -0.08** ( 0.04 )
logF 0.25*** ( 0.02 ) 0.22*** ( 0.02 )
1/σE -0.59*** ( 0.04 ) -0.52*** ( 0.04 )
EXRET -0.79*** ( 0.12 ) -0.74*** ( 0.12 )
NI/TA -3.37*** ( 0.18 ) -1.80*** ( 0.27 )
NI/TA*(logE) -0.77*** ( 0.09 )
(logE) ∗ (logE) -0.05*** ( 0.01 )
(logF ) ∗ (logE) 0.02*** ( 0.01 )
This table reports on the parameter estimates of the four reference models, and the corresponding
augmented models which have additional effects related to information noise. The reference models are
labeled as “S01”, “CJ04”, “DSW07-S” and “BS08” models respectively, in the corresponding columns. The
augmented models are next to the corresponding reference models. The sample period is 1979–2012.
There are 2,112 bankruptcies, and 2,152,203 firm-month observations in the full sample. All models
are Cox [1972] proportional hazard models with time-varying covariates. All explanatory variables are
described in Table 1, and all logarithms are natural logarithms. A positive coefficient on a particular
variable in the reference models implies that the hazard rate is increasing in that variable, and vice versa.
In the augmented models, the coefficient on a covariate (if it also has an interaction effect) is a linear
function of the proxy for the degree of noise. Robust standard errors are are reported in parentheses (see
Lin and Wei [1989] or Allison [2010]). (*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant
at 10% level).
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unaware of, apart from our study, any prediction, or alternative explanation, about the
signs of the coefficients on these interaction effects, in the empirical literature of credit
risk.
To test Hypothesis 2, following Chava and Jarrow [2004], we conduct a likelihood
ratio test to test if our proposed effects as a whole, i.e., interaction effects and proxies for
the degree of noise, significantly improve the in-sample Goodness-of-Fit. The results are
reported in Panel A of Table 4. Here we treat the reference models as the constrained
versions of the augmented models, by constraining the coefficients on our proposed effects
to zero. The unconstrained versions are simply augmented models. The difference in (the
minimized) -2log-likelihood (−2 logL) of the two versions provides a likelihood ratio test
(χ2-test), under the null hypothesis that the constrained model is the true model. As can
be seen from the column labeled as “χ2 Statistics” in Panel A of Table 4 (which is the
difference in −2 logL of two models), the likelihood of the augmented models is much, and
significantly, larger than that of the corresponding reference models, implying that we can
easily reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the augmented models are significantly
better in terms of in-sample Goodness-of-Fit. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2, and
again strongly supports the validity of our proposed hazard specifications in bankruptcy
forecasting.
We also report, in Panel B of Table 4, alternative Goodness-of-Fit measures that
are popular in the literature, namely McFadden’s pseudo-R2 (pseudo-R2) and Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC).61 Higher pseudo-R2 or lower AIC implies better in-sample
model fit. As shown in Panel B of Table 4, the augmented models have better Goodness-
of-Fit by either measure, which are again consistent with Hypothesis 2.62
5.2 Out-of-Sample Tests of Forecasting Accuracy
With respect to Hypothesis 3, we conduct out-of-sample tests, in three steps, to assess
forecasting accuracy of the reference and augmented models.
First, similar to Chava and Jarrow [2004], Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007], we build ten
holdout samples, one for each year during 2003–2012.63 Any firm whose information is
available at the beginning of a holdout year is included as one observation into the hold-
out sample for that particular year.64 Every observation also has an indicator variable,
61I thank Jens Hilscher for suggesting these measures. Examples in the previous literature that used
pseudo-R2 include Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi [2008] or Campbell, Hilscher and Szilagyi [2011].
62Like the results in Panel A of Table 4, measures in Panel B are also based on log-likelihood.
Therefore, it might be unsurprising that we find similar conclusions using likelihood ratio tests and
alternative measures.
63Like Chava and Jarrow [2004], we also generate 1,000 bootstrapped holdout samples over 2003-
2012. The results on the bootstrapped samples are very similar to those reported in this paper, and are
available upon request.
64Note that a firm is included only if it has information available at the beginning of a holdout year.
Thus, for example, firms entering the database in the middle of a holdout year will not be included into
the holdout sample of that year.
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Table 4: In-sample Goodness-of-Fit on our proposed hazard specifications
Panel A: Likelihood Ratio test
−2 logL −2 logL χ2 Degree of
p-valueUnconstrained Constrained Statistics Freedom
Augmented S01 Model 30301.24 31199.65 898.40 4 < 0.001
Augmented CJ04 Model 30047.78 31048.98 1001.20 5 < 0.001
Augmented DSW07-S Model 31297.20 31364.65 67.45 2 < 0.001
Augmented BS08 Model 30203.37 30418.94 215.57 3 < 0.001
Panel B: Alternative Goodness-of-Fit measures
Pseudo-R2 AIC
S01 Model 0.1511 31209.65
Augmented S01 Model 0.1755 30319.24
CJ04 Model 0.1552 31076.98
Augmented CJ04 Model 0.1824 30085.78
DSW07-S Model 0.1466 31372.65
Augmented DSW07-S Model 0.1484 31309.20
BS08 Model 0.1723 30430.94
Augmented BS08 Model 0.1782 30221.37
This table reports on a Likelihood Ratio test and alternative Goodness-of-Fit measures, in Panel
A and B respectively. The Likelihood Ratio test tests the statistical significance of all effects
related to information noise as a whole (including both main and interaction effects). The aug-
mented models, with our proposed effects, are considered as unconstrained models, and the
reference models, without these effects, are considered as constrained models (by constraining
the coefficients on our proposed effects to zero). The difference in −2 logL between the con-
strained and unconstrained models are listed in the column labeled as “χ2 Statistics”. The
alternative Goodness-of-Fit measures include McFadden’s pseudo-R2 (pseudo-R2) and Akaike
Information Criteria (AIC), which are listed in the corresponding columns for the reference and
augmented models respectively. Higher pseudo-R2 or lower AIC implies better in-sample model
fit. The sample period is 1979–2012. There are 2,112 bankruptcies, and 2,152,203 firm-month
observations in the full sample.
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indicating whether it files bankruptcy within the relevant holdout year. In total, within
the entire ten-year holdout period, we have 53,636 observations to be predicted, and 558
bankruptcy events, from 8,905 (distinct) firms.
Second, we produce one-year-ahead forecasts for all models. We use the same set of
independent variables as those in Table 3. At the beginning of each holdout year, we
re-estimate coefficients on all independent variables based on the information available
at that time. We then forecast bankruptcies within the particular holdout year, using
the re-estimated models and available information. For example, to predict bankruptcies
within the holdout sample of 2005, we re-estimate all models using the firm-month panel
data from January 1, 1979 to December 31, 2004, and then use information available
at December 31, 2004, together with the re-estimated models, to produce forecasts of
bankruptcy in 2005. Like most studies in the previous literature, we consider rank or-
dering, not the exact probability of bankruptcy. Hence, the model forecasts are in fact a
score. For example, the scores for the augmented models are65
Score = β¯′Xt + γ¯0a˜+
I∑
i=1
γ¯i(a˜ ∗X it), (6)
where the notations are the same as in Equation (4), and β¯, γ¯0, . . . , γ¯I are estimated from
data.
Finally, we rank observations within each holdout year according to the model scores,
and assess forecasting accuracy of the rankings. The standard measures of bankruptcy
forecasting accuracy are Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curve together with
its summary statistics, Area Under ROC Curve (henceforth, AUC), and Cumulative
Accuracy Profile (CAP) curve together with the associated summary statistics, Gini
coefficient (GINI). Because AUC and GINI are equivalent,66 we only report AUC as our
first measure of forecasting accuracy, both year-by-year and on average. AUC is also used
in, for example, Chava and Jarrow [2004], Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007]. The second
measure we employ is the one adopted in Shumway [2001], Chava and Jarrow [2004],
Bharath and Shumway [2008], which is the captured proportions of the total number of
bankruptcies within deciles. To calculate this measure, for each holdout year, we count
the number of captured bankruptcies, within each decile that is formed by sorting and
grouping model scores. Then we aggregate the number of bankruptcies in each decile
across the entire 10-year holdout period, and calculate them as percentages of the total
number of bankruptcies. We recognize that this measure is equivalent to a bankruptcy-
65In our case, the one-year-ahead survival probability produced by the Cox model, assuming all firms
have updated information at the beginning of a holdout year, is a monotonic transformation of the score
in Equation (6). Consequently, the rank orderings produced by survival probability and the score are
the same.
66GINI = 2AUC−1. For more details of these, and other, measures of discriminative power of rating
systems, see, for example, Engelmann, Hayden and Tasche [2003].
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weighted aggregate CAP curve over the entire 10-year holdout period. We adopt this
measure because it provides another perspective and more details on models’ predictive
performance.
We report the out-of-sample AUC of all models, in corresponding columns of Table 5
(labeled by model names). Higher AUC implies better forecasting accuracy. To compare
AUC of an augmented model with AUC of its corresponding reference model in each
holdout year, we conduct a χ2-test of DeLong, DeLong and Clarke-Pearson [1988], which
tests the difference of two correlated ROC curves.67 The test results are reported in the
four columns labeled as “AUC Difference”, with χ2 statistics in parentheses.68 We also
report the average AUC difference over the 10 holdout years. In spirit of the Lyapounov
Central Limit Theorem, we conduct a χ2-test to test if the average AUC difference is
significantly different from zero.69
In Table 5, the reference models have notably very high forecasting accuracy, all with
average out-of-sample AUC above 0.9. This is consistent with the results from the pre-
vious literature, and might be attributed to proper variable selection, high frequency
(monthly frequency) in observations, availability of market information and high-quality
accounting information in Compustat. On top of such predictive models, Table 5 shows
that our interaction effects still achieve statistically significant and persistent improve-
ments on forecasting accuracy. Typically, in more than half of the 10 holdout years, the
augmented models, with our interaction effects, significantly outperform their correspond-
ing reference models, at <10% level, but never perform significantly worse.70 In fact, out
of the 10 holdout years, there are very few years in which the augmented models’ AUC
is less than that of their corresponding reference models.71 Not surprising, the average
improvements in AUC of the augmented models are highly significant.72
To the best of our knowledge, the above out-of-sample results, especially the year-by-
year AUC improvements, are one of the strongest pieces of evidence in the literature.73
67Because we calculate AUC of two models within the same holdout year, a test on correlated ROC
curves is deemed appropriate.
68We only focus on out-of-sample results in Table 5, for each holdout year and averaged over the
entire holdout period. The in-sample Goodness-of-Fit statistics (based on data before any holdout year)
are omitted here for brevity and are available upon request.
69Assuming each AUC difference is drawn independently from different normal distributions, the
Lyapounov Central Limit Theorem gives the sampling distribution of the average AUC difference. We
can then conduct a χ2-test in a standard way, on the null hypothesis that the mean of the sampling
distribution is zero.
70We also find similar results on the 1,000 bootstrapped holdout samples. The augmented models are
typically significantly better than the reference models in around 60% of the 1,000 holdout samples, and
insignificantly better in 25%–30%, insignificantly worse in about 10%, significantly worse in less than
5%.
71Note that the χ2-test has the null hypothesis of “AUC Difference= 0”. Had it been an one-tailed
t-test with the null hypothesis of “AUC Difference< 0”, we would have seen more holdout years with
significant improvements.
72Similar to Chava and Jarrow [2004], we also conduct (paired) t-tests and nonparametric tests on
the 1,000 bootstrapped holdout samples, which confirm the results.
73We note that Chava and Jarrow [2004], Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007] conducted similar out-of-
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The high statistical significance of the AUC increments manifests the robustness and
persistence of the improvements in forecasting accuracy.74 By controlling the main effects
of the covariates from the reference models, we ensure that the improvements come purely
from our proposed interaction effects. Therefore, the tests on out-of-sample AUC provide
strong evidence that our interaction effects markedly improve hazard model specifications.
We examine the second measure of forecasting accuracy, the fractions of the total
number of bankruptcies captured within deciles, aggregated over the entire 10 holdout
years, in Panel A of Table 6. Panel B is similar to Panel A, except that, in each decile,
we calculate the cumulative fractions (over the previous deciles) of the total number of
bankruptcies.
To interpret the results in Panel A of Table 6, a model is deemed better than another
if it captures more bankruptcies in the first few deciles. Apparently, the augmented
models capture more bankruptcies, than their corresponding reference models, in all of
the top two or three deciles.75 For example, Augmented BS08 Model captures 75.45%
of the total number of bankruptcies in the first decile, higher than 74.74% captured by
BS08 Model. Likewise, in the second and third deciles, Augmented BS08 Model also
captures more bankruptcies (13.26% vs 12.72%, and 4.3% vs 4.12%, respectively). We
also note that, within the low-risk deciles (deciles 6-10), the augmented models capture
less bankruptcies, and thus has less misclassification, than the corresponding reference
models. Therefore, Panel A of Table 6 demonstrates that our proposed interaction effects
indeed improve the discriminative power of the reference models.
In Panel B of Table 6, we report the cumulative captured proportions of total
bankruptcies, which are effectively CAP curves. As a standard criterion to compare
two CAP curves, one model unambiguously outperforms another if its CAP curve is no
lower than the CAP curve of another model in all deciles. Clearly, this is the case in
Panel B of Table 6, where the CAP curves of the augmented models are higher than
or equal to, in all deciles, those of the corresponding reference models. The evidence is
unambiguous, and further confirms the superior predictive performance of the augmented
models.
Altogether, Table 5 and Table 6 provide strong empirical evidence that our proposed
interaction effects significantly improve the out-of-sample forecasting accuracy of hazard
sample tests. However, Chava and Jarrow [2004] reported the average AUC difference but no year-by-year
results. Duffie, Saita and Wang [2007] reported year-by-year AUC but without comparing them to any
benchmark using statistical tests.
74The absolute magnitude in the AUC differences depends on how noisy a specific sample is. In
robustness checks (Section 5.3), we show that, when data is noisier and less frequently updated, the
absolute magnitude in AUC improvements can be substantial.
75We note that the augmented models not only outperform in the first decile, as usually seen in the
previous literature, but are also better in the second, and sometimes third, deciles. This is expected,
because our proposed interaction effects impact the rankings of firms if firms have different degrees of
noise. Such impacts are not necessarily associated with the predicted probability of bankruptcy. Thus,
the improvements on captured bankruptcies might occur in multiple deciles.
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models. Hence, these results strongly support the use of our hazard specifications in
real-world bankruptcy forecasting, where firm-specific information is likely to be noisy.
5.3 Robustness Check
In this section, we test the robustness of our proposed hazard specifications in three
aspects. First, we check if our empirical results are robust to the choices of proxy for the
degree of noise. Second, following convention in the literature, we remove financial firms
from our sample and check if the results persist. Third, instead of using the empirical
setup in the previous sections, we test the impact of our hazard specifications in an envi-
ronment where information quality is a more serious problem. Within this environment,
we have no market information, less frequently updated financial reports, fewer explana-
tory covariates, and many outliers. This environment is typical for creditors (or rating
agents) to predict bankruptcy/default of private firms.76 In the following, we present all
results using robust standard errors, although the standard errors are not reported here
for brevity.
As the first robustness check, we report, in Table 7, the combined results of the full-
sample estimates and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, using a number of alternative
proxies for the degree of noise (the second column of Table 7), including firm’s asset rank
(log(AR)), equity market value (logE),77 analyst coverage (AC) and normalized variation
in analyst forecasts (− log(CV)), as described in Section 3. The datasets (including 10
holdout samples) and reference models we use here are the same as those described before,
in Sections 3 and 4. Using these alternative proxies, we construct new augmented models
by adding the interaction effects (the third column of Table 7) into the corresponding
reference models (the first column of Table 7). For brevity, we only report the full-
sample estimates of the interaction effects in the augmented models (the fourth column
of Table 7), and the average out-of-sample AUC differences, between the augmented and
corresponding reference models (the fifth column of Table 7).78
As shown in Table 7, the coefficients on all interaction effects have the same signs as
those predicted by Hypothesis 1, irrespective of what proxies for the degree of noise are
adopted, and what reference models are used. This result is striking, and shows that the
predictions of Hypothesis 1 are indeed general rules rather than special cases. As for out-
of-sample forecasting accuracy, compared to results using log(TA) as a proxy, log(AR)
76Such creditors include, for example, banking institutions, or investors in private firm debts.
77Recall that when adding logE, as a proxy for the degree of noise, to S01 Model and CJ04 Model,
we exclude RSIZE as a covariate to prevent multi-collinearity problems, due to strong contemporaneous
correlation between them (0.92). As another robustness check, we also use RSIZE as a proxy, and get
similarly favorable results on our proposed interaction effects. The results are not shown for brevity, and
are available upon request.
78The details of other in-sample and out-of-sample tests, omitted here for brevity, are available upon
request.
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Table 7: Robustness check: alternative proxies for the degree of noise
Full sample: 1979–2012, 2,152,203 firm-months, 2,112 bankruptcies
Holdout samples: 2003–2012, 53,636 one-year-ahead forecasts for each model, 558 bankruptcies
Reference Proxy for the Our Proposed Full Sample Average Uplift of
Model Degree of Noise Interaction Effect Estimate Out-of-Sample AUC
S01
log(AR)
EXRET*log(AR) -0.38***
1.03× 10−2 ***
Model
TL/TA*log(AR) 0.30***
σE*log(AR) 0.11***
logE
EXRET*logE -0.15***
7.50× 10−3 ***NI/TA*logE -0.80***TL/TA*logE 0.09**
σE ∗ logE 0.10***
− log(CV) EXRET*(− log(CV)) -0.15*** 3.98× 10−3 **
σE*(− log(CV)) 0.03***
CJ04
log(AR)
EXRET*log(AR) -0.35***
1.19× 10−2 ***
Model
TL/TA*log(AR) 0.37***
σE*log(AR) 0.09***
logE
EXRET*logE -0.13**
7.51× 10−3 ***NI/TA*logE -0.79***TL/TA*logE 0.12***
σE ∗ logE 0.09***
− log(CV) EXRET*(− log(CV)) -0.15*** 2.98× 10−3 *
σE*(− log(CV)) 0.03**
DSW07-S
log(AR) (Naïve DD)*log(AR) -0.06*** 7.68× 10−3 ***
Model
− log(CV) RETURN*(− log(CV)) -0.10*** 3.71× 10−3 ***
AC RETURN*AC -0.09** 2.06× 10−3 ***
BS08 − log(CV) RETURN*(− log(CV)) -0.11*** 3.40× 10−3 ***
Model AC RETURN*AC -0.12*** 2.18× 10−3 *
This table provides a summary of both full-sample estimates, and average improvements in
out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, of the augmented models when alternative proxies for the
degree of noise are adopted. The full-sample period is 1979–2012. There are 2,112 bankruptcies,
and 2,152,203 firm-month observations in our dataset. The holdout sample period is 2003–
2012. There are 558 bankruptcies, and 53,636 firm-year observations to be predicted within the
entire holdout sample. We construct the augmented models by adding the interaction effects
(the third column) into the corresponding reference models (the first column). The interaction
effects are created using alternative proxies for the degree of noise (the second column). When
using logE as a proxy within S01 and CJ04 Models, we exclude RSIZE as a covariate to prevent
multi-collinearity problems, due to strong contemporaneous correlation between them (0.92).
For brevity, we only report the full-sample estimates of the coefficients on the interaction effects
(the fourth column), and the average out-of-sample AUC differences between the augmented and
corresponding reference models (the fifth column). The statistical significance of the full-sample
estimates is tested using robust standard errors (not reported here). (*** significantly different
from zero at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant at 10% level)
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and logE give similar improvements in AUC.79 This confirms the validity of using firm
size to create our interaction effects. For AC and − log(CV), the AUC improvements
are also significant on average, at <10% level, although the absolute magnitude of the
improvements is marginal. Given the lack of variation in these two variables due to the
high proportion of missing values,80 this out-of-sample predictive performance is in fact
surprisingly good. It indicates that they are appropriate proxies for the degree of noise,
and that our hazard specifications work reasonably well even when data availability of
good proxies is low.
In the second robustness check, we follow convention in the previous literature to
exclude financial firms in our sample, i.e. firms with CRSP SIC between 6000 and 6800.
We then re-run all the models specified in Table 3.81 We report the combined results of
the full-sample estimates and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy in Table 8, which has a
similar format to that of Table 7.
We find that both in-sample and out-of-sample results, in Table 8, are actually slightly
better than those using data without exclusions (i.e. results reported in Sections 5.1 and
5.2). Our interaction effects now have even higher in-sample statistical significance, again
with the expected signs. For example, the variable “σE*log(TA)” in the augmented S01
Model now has a p-value of <0.0001, as opposed to 0.04 in Table 3. The improvements in
out-of-sample forecasting accuracy brought by our interaction effects are also greater. For
example, now the augmented BS08 Model has an average uplift of AUC 0.0074 (significant
at 1% level), increasing from 0.0048 (significant at 5% level) reported in Table 5. Similar
results are observed for all augmented models in Table 8. Therefore, we demonstrate that
our hazard specifications are robust to the choices of firm subpopulation.
In the third robustness check, we consider a different empirical setup, where firms’
market information is unavailable, firms’ accounting reports are updated annually, and
there are fewer explanatory covariates available, potentially with many outliers. Such
environment might be more realistic for practical default prediction, for instance, on
bank loans within an internal rating system. While the setup poses more difficulties for
modeling, our proposed hazard specifications are expected to bring substantially more
benefits in this case where imperfect information becomes a more severe problem. We
show this is indeed the case, in the following investigation.
Now we use Compustat Annual (North America) accounting data to construct in-
dependent variables. Without the requirements of joining CRSP data, we are able to
include more bankruptcy events in the new dataset, 2,537 in total. The full sample now
has 290,811 firm-year observations, from a total of 27,443 firms. As before, we perform
79In the case of log(AR), results are even better.
80Recall that, as shown in Section 4, these two variables have more than half of their values with only
one or two values, due to missing value.
81We also use asset rank as a proxy for the degree of noise on this dataset, and obtain similar results
(not reported here).
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Table 8: Robustness check: non-financial firms
Full sample: 1979–2012, 1,769,316 firm-month observations, 1,895 bankruptcies
Holdout samples: 2003–2012, 41,955 one-year-ahead forecasts for each model, 470 bankruptcies
Reference Our Proposed Full Sample Average Uplift of
Model Interaction Effect Estimate Out-of-Sample AUC
S01 Model
EXRET*log(TA) -0.25***
1.12× 10−2 ***NI/TA*log(TA) -0.36***
σE*log(TA) 0.10***
CJ04 Model
EXRET*log(TA) -0.24***
1.24× 10−2 ***NI/TA*log(TA) -0.26***TL/TA*log(TA) 0.19***
σE*log(TA) 0.09***
DSW07-S Model (Naïve DD)*log(TA) -0.03*** 6.69× 10−3 ***
BS08 Model
NI/TA*logE -0.72***
7.42× 10−3 ***logE ∗ logE -0.05***
logF ∗ logE 0.02***
This table provides a summary of both full-sample estimates, and average improvements in out-
of-sample forecasting accuracy, of the augmented models when financial firms (with CRSP SIC
between 6000 and 6800) are excluded. The full-sample period is 1979–2012. There are 1,895
bankruptcies, and 1,769,316 firm-month observations in our dataset. The holdout sample period
is 2003–2012. There are 470 bankruptcies, and 41,955 firm-year observations to be predicted
within the entire holdout period. Based on this dataset, we test all the models specified in Table
3. For brevity, we only report the full-sample estimates of the coefficients on the interaction
effects in the augmented models (the third column), and the average out-of-sample AUC dif-
ferences between the augmented and corresponding reference models (the fourth column). The
statistical significance of the full-sample estimates is tested using robust standard errors (not
reported here). (*** significantly different from zero at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, *
significant at 10% level)
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winsorization (at 1st and 99th percentiles), missing value imputation (by carrying for-
ward) and currency conversion (CAD to USD). To facilitate this “private firm” modeling
environment, we choose the “Private Firm Model” in Chava and Jarrow [2004] as our ref-
erence model, which uses the two financial ratios, NI/TA and TL/TA, from S01 Model.82
The augmented model is developed by using total assets (log(TA)) as the proxy for the
degree of noise, and interacting it with NI/TA and TL/TA respectively.83 We report the
combined results on the full-sample estimates and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy in
Table 9.
We make a number of notes on Table 9. Within the reference model, interestingly the
full-sample estimate of coefficient on NI/TA is insignificant. Further investigation of the
data reveals that the insignificance might be caused by many (more than 1%) extreme
values in this variable, or outliers.84 These outliers turn out to be less correlated with
bankruptcy events, and thus cause the main effect of NI/TA to be insignificant. We note
that these outliers typically have very low total assets, and, as small firms, their account-
ing information might have high degree of noise. A potential solution is to further win-
sorize NI/TA at, for example, 5th percentile. Nevertheless, although further winsorization
can make this variable statistically significant in sample, the out-of-sample forecasting
accuracy deteriorates significantly.85 This is probably because over-winsorization distorts
the data too much and produces unintended consequences (for example, biased estimates),
which poses a dilemma for the winsorization approach to handle outliers.
On the contrary, our approach does not excessively distort the data. We augment the
data with a new variable, i.e., the degree of noise, and use our interaction effects to take
into account of noise in the data. As shown in Table 9, this approach remarkably improves
the hazard specification. First, the full-sample estimates of our interaction effects (-0.09
and 0.14, respectively) are highly significant, at <1% level. Second, with our interaction
effects, the coefficient on NI/TA becomes [−0.05−0.09 log(TA)], which is now statistically
significant because both -0.05 and -0.09 are significantly different from zero.86 Third, the
column labeled as “−2 logL” shows that the log-likelihood, as an in-sample Goodness-
of-Fit measure, of the augmented model is significantly higher than that of the reference
model, as demonstrated by the difference of −2 logL and its p-value, in the last two rows
82The reference model adopted here is, of course, a simplistic one. It is not central to us how to build
a full-fledged model for private firms, or bank loans. Our intention is to show the potential benefits of
our hazard specifications when they are used within a similar setup.
83We also use asset rank as the proxy to create interaction effects. The results, not reported here, are
similar.
84Obviously, winsorization at 1st percentile does not solve this problem, because there are more than
1% outliers, and NI/TA still has extreme values after winsorization.
85The average out-of-sample AUC of the model built on the 5-percentile-winsorized data is 0.7618,
significantly worse than that of the reference model (0.7882, as shown in Table 9), which is built on the
1-percentile-winsorized data but has insignificant NI/TA.
86In this case, we might say that the coefficient on NI/TA is not significantly different from zero if
neither -0.05 nor -0.09 are significantly different from zero, a hypothesis that we can easily reject here.
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Table 9: Robustness check: private firm models
Full sample: 1979–2012, 290,811 firm-year observations, 2,537 bankruptcies
Holdout samples: 2003–2012, 90,407 one-year-ahead forecasts for each model, 758 bankruptcies
Model Variable Full Sample −2 logL Average ofEstimate Out-of-Sample AUC
Private Firm NI/TA -0.02 45,933 0.7882
Model TL/TA 0.24***
NI/TA -0.05** 44,596 0.8304
Augmented TL/TA 0.17***
Private Firm log(TA) -0.12***
Model NI/TA*log(TA) -0.09***
TL/TA*log(TA) 0.14***
Difference (= Private Firm Model - Augmented Model) 1,337 -0.0422
p-value from a χ2-test < 0.0001 < 0.0001
This table provides a summary of full-sample estimates, in-sample Goodness-of-Fit and average
out-of-sample forecasting accuracy, of the reference and augmented models within a “private
firm”-style empirical setup. We use Compustat Annual (North America) accounting data, with-
out joining CRSP data. The full-sample period is 1979–2012. There are 2,537 bankruptcies,
and 290,811 firm-year observations in our dataset. The holdout sample period is 2003–2012.
There are 758 bankruptcies, and 90,407 firm-year observations to be predicted within the entire
holdout period. We perform winsorization (at 1st and 99th percentiles), missing value imputa-
tion (by carrying forward) and currency conversion (CAD to USD). We adopt the “Private Firm
Model” from Chava and Jarrow [2004] as our reference model. We develop augmented models
using total assets (log(TA)) as the proxy for the degree of noise, and interact it with NI/TA
and TL/TA respectively. The full-sample estimates of the coefficients on independent variables
of both models are reported in the third column. The statistical significance of the full-sample
estimates is tested using robust standard errors (not reported here). In the the fourth and fifth
columns, respectively, we report -2log-likelihood (−2 logL), as an in-sample Goodness-of-Fit
measure, and the average out-of-sample AUC, of both models, together with their differences
and p-values from χ2-tests. (*** significant at 1% level, ** significant at 5% level, * significant
at 10% level)
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in Table 9.
Furthermore, to shed lights on how our approach improves the in-sample model fit,
we note that the coefficient on NI/TA is now dynamic, depending on TA. When TA
is small, which implies that the degree of noise is high, the coefficient automatically
decreases in magnitude, reflecting that NI/TA becomes less responsive to bankruptcy
risk when information is noisier. Therefore, our hazard specifications, represented by
the “Augmented Private Firm Model” in Table 9, have a built-in mechanism to handle
outliers driven by information noise.
Finally, our specifications dramatically improve the out-of-sample forecasting accu-
racy. As can be seen from the last column of Table 9, the average improvement in
out-of-sample AUC (over 10 holdout samples) is 0.0422, which is highly significant, both
statistically and in magnitude. If we translate AUC into GINI, which is a popular mea-
sure used in the industry, GINI of the reference and augmented models are 0.57 and 0.66,
respectively. They are in different magnitude from a practical perspective. Thus, this in-
vestigation demonstrates that our proposed hazard specifications are robust to empirical
setup, and their potential benefits might be substantial in real-world applications.
The third robustness check also reconciles the conflicting empirical findings on NI/TA
in the literature. The statistical insignificance of the coefficient on NI/TA in the reference
model is the same phenomenon documented in the previous literature (see, for example,
Chava, Stefanescu and Turnbull [2011]). Our approach provides a plausible explanation
why the coefficient on NI/TA can be insignificant, and how to handle these situations.
6 Conclusions
We introduce new hazard specifications that explicitly handle information noise in
the input data, and empirically show their efficacy, using full-sample tests, out-of-sample
tests, and a variety of robustness checks.
Our paper advances the literature in a number of ways. First, our specifications im-
prove the empirical performance of popular hazard models, on both in-sample Goodness-
of-Fit and out-of-sample forecasting accuracy. Second, we provide an empirical imple-
mentation of a theory of modeling credit risk with incomplete information (Duffie and
Lando [2001]). Third, we highlight the importance, and provide a tool, to take into ac-
count of information noise within credit risk-related studies. Fourth, our specifications
have a built-in mechanism to elegantly handle outliers, without excessively distorting
data.
We also expect our proposed hazard specifications have a broad range of real-world
applications in the financial industry. Our approach is theoretically justified, and prac-
tically easy to implement. We demonstrate the empirical success of our specifications,
and potentially substantial benefits of using them in cases where data quality is a more
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serious problem. These advantages of our specifications are particularly appealing to the
industry.
There are several possibilities for future work. First, while this paper predicts
bankruptcy events for public firms, if data is available, it might also be interesting to test
our proposed hazard specifications using default events, and for private firms. Second,
we might explore alternative ways to construct proxies for the degree of noise. Potential
candidates include corporate governance quality, expert judgments, or syntheses of mul-
tiple information quality measures. Third, we can conduct empirical study comparing
different ways to handle outliers in default prediction. Finally, we might study other
forms of incomplete information, like biased accounting reports or delayed information,
or other ways to handle information quality issues.
Appendices
A Theoretical Probability of Bankruptcy with Incomplete Information
The conditional probability of bankruptcy (PB) of the debt issuer (firm), in Equation
(1), is a function of the following parameters (see Duffie and Lando [2001]), when we set
t = 1, s = 2,
1. V0: the initial value of firm assets. We normalize it to be 1 throughout this paper,
so that all other parameters can be expressed as a multiple of V0;
2. µ: the expected growth rate of firm assets;
3. σ: the volatility of firm assets’ growth rate;
4. δ > 0: total cash flow generated by firm, expressed as a fraction of assets. In other
words, the amount of cash flow at time t is δVt;
5. r: the constant discount rate used to discount future cash flows by both firm and
creditors. Because the DL model assumes all economic agents are risk-neutral, r is
thus the riskless interest rate determined by the market;
6. θ > 0: tax rate of firm;
7. α: a fraction of assets, ∈ [0, 1], representing the loss due to friction costs in event
of default/bankruptcy (i.e., bankruptcy costs);
8. D > 0: the face value of debt issued by firm, modeled as a consol bond;
9. C > 0: a constant coupon paid by the firm debt;
10. Vˆ1: the observed (noisy) assets;
37
11. a > 0: the standard deviation of noise associated with log(assets);
12. u = −a2
2
: the mean of noise associated with log(assets), assuming accounting report
is unbiased.
Note that the bankruptcy threshold, v, in Equation (1) is determined endogenously by
other parameters.
To plot Figures 2 and 6, we vary Vˆ1 and a, and then calculate rN = ( Vˆ1V0 − 1) and DVˆ1 ,
in Figure 2 and 6 respectively. We fix other parameters at the following set of values,
V0 = 1; µ = 1.125%; σ = 5%; δ = 5%; r = 6%; θ = 35%; α = 30%;
D = 1.28; C = 0.0787. (7)
Note that Equation (7) implies that the coupon rate of the debt is C/D = 6.15% per
annum.
Likewise, to plot Figure 4, we vary µ and a, fixing other parameters at the following
set of values,
V0 = 1; Vˆ1 = 1; σ = 5%; δ = 5%; r = 6%; θ = 35%; α = 30%;
D = 1.28; C = 0.0787. (8)
To plot Figure 5, we vary σ and a, fixing other parameters at the following set of
values,
V0 = 1; Vˆ1 = 1; µ = 1.125%; δ = 5%; r = 6%; θ = 35%; α = 30%;
D = 1.28; C = 0.0787. (9)
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Figure 4: Theoretical log(probability of bankruptcy), varying the degree of noise and
expected growth rate of assets
Figure 5: Theoretical log(probability of bankruptcy), varying the degree of noise and
volatility of asset growth rate
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Figure 6: Theoretical log(probability of bankruptcy), varying the degree of noise and
normalized debt face value (normalized by observed, noisy assets)
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